In re Kimler [DISSENT] by Carter, Jesse W.
Golden Gate University School of Law
GGU Law Digital Commons
Jesse Carter Opinions The Jesse Carter Collection
7-13-1951
In re Kimler [DISSENT]
Jesse W. Carter
Supreme Court of California
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/carter_opinions
Part of the Criminal Law Commons
This Opinion is brought to you for free and open access by the The Jesse Carter Collection at GGU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Jesse Carter Opinions by an authorized administrator of GGU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
jfischer@ggu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Carter, Jesse W., "In re Kimler [DISSENT]" (1951). Jesse Carter Opinions. Paper 435.
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/carter_opinions/435
G68 IN RE KI"LVlLER 
Tlw ot'dt>r,.; n t·e affirmP!l withont prejudiee to appellant 
right to ,.,,,,.];: restit11tion aftr·r th0 disposition of thr prop-
t•rty is :-;ptt]<.(L 
Oibson, C. ,J., Shenk, ,J., Edmonds, .J., Carter, ,J., Sehauer, 
.T., and Spenct>, .J., conenned. 
Appellant\; jWtition for a l'f'heal'ing was denietl Attgust n, 
1!JG1. 
[Crim. Xo. 5046. ln Bank. July 13, 19fil.] 
In re CIIARI"..ES \:VAI.1KEH KIMLER, on Habeas Corpus. 
[1a, 1b] Extradition-Habeas Corpus-Judgment-Finality of De-
termination.-ln habeas corpus proceedings, petitioner cannot 
successfully assert that the judgment of a court of a sister state 
in habeas corpus proceedings, discharging him from detention 
under an extradition warrant of this state, is a final determina-
tion that the action of local authorities in paroling him to the 
prison authorities of a third state operated as a pardon barring 
his further imprisonmPnt in this state, where the judgment 
relied on does not purport to be such a final determination, but, 
by its clear language, determines only that "the facts and 
circumstances are not sufficient to justify" extradition, and 
that "no sufficient cause for the detention" of the petitioner 
was shown. 
[2] !d.-Habeas Corpus-Jurisdiction.-A court of a sister state 
is without jurisdiction, in a habeas corpus proceeding in con-
nection with extradition, to adjudicate the question of the 
effect on petitioner's liability for further imprisonment in this 
state of the action of local authorities in releasing him on 
parole to the prison authorities of a third state. 
[3] !d.-Habeas Corpus-Scope of Inquiry.-The scope of inquiry 
in a summary proceeding in habeas corpus to prevent extradi-
tion is normally limited to a determination of whether the 
statutory prerequisites have been complied with in the requisi-
tion and rendition, the court being without authority to inquire 
into the merits of the charge against the person whose extradi-
tion is sought. 
[4] Judgments-Sister State Judgments.-A court should not place 
on the judgment of a court of a sister state a construction 
[ 4] See 1fi Cal.Jur. 240; 31 Am.Jur. 138. 
McK. Dig. References: [1-3, 5] Extradition,§ 14; [4] Judgments, 
§ 472; [6] Extradition,§ 5; [7] Prisons and Prisoners,§ 15. 
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which is out of harmony with the decisions of the highest court 
of the state in which it is rendered. 
[5] Extradition-Habeas Corpus-Judgment-Res Judicata.-A 
discharge of petitioner in habeas corpus proceedings in B 
sister state in connection with his extradition therefrom is not 
res judicata in habeas corpus proceedings in this state attack~ 
ing the rig·ht of this state to continue his imprisonment after 
having released him on parole. 
[6] Id.- Persons Extraditable- Persons Paroled. It i~ elr•arly 
established that petitioner went to priwn in a sister statr• 
voluntarily under a conditional parolP and that this state's 
jurisdiction over him continued, where the evidence fully sup-
ports a referee's finding that petitioner, in connection with his 
parole application, requested a personal interview relative to a 
detainer placed against him by the sister state, in which inter-
view he requested that arrangements be made to return him to 
prison in the sister state, and that when he was turned over 
to an agent of that state he sigm•d a "Ticket of Leave" and 
letter setting forth the conditions of his parol<:>. 
[7] Prisons and Prisoners-Parole.-Once having <:>lected to accept 
a conditional parole, the parolee is bound by the express terms 
thereof. 
PROCEEDING m habeas corpus to secure relem;e from 
custody. Writ denied. 
Ernrst Spagnoli, at rcqHPst of Petitioner appointed by 
Supreme Court, for Petitioner. 
Fred N. Howser and Edmund G. Brown, Attorneys General, 
B. Abbott Goldberg and Clarence A. Linn, Deputy Attorneys 
General, for Respondent. 
EDMONDS, ,J.-B:· his petition for a writ of habeas 
eorpus, Charles W alkPr Kimler is attacking the right of this 
statr to contimw his imprisonment after he was releasrd upon 
parole. Hr asserts that, in effect, the parole granted to 
him was a pardon. He also relies upon a judgment in Mis-
souri by which be was released from custody following his 
arrest upon a warrant of extradition. 
After having been convicted in this state and sentenced 
to life imprisonment under each of three separate judgments, 
the sentence8 to run coneurrently, he was released upon 
[6] Extradition of paroled convict, note, 78 A.L.R. 419. See, 
also, 12 Cal.Jur. 397; 22 Am.Jur. 264. 
in the Missouri nroe1?ec1m.f! 
determination that the action the California 
him to Illinois was a which 
in this state. There are two 
to this contention,. [1] First, the Missouri court 
""""·""'+ to determine the effect of Kimler's release 
authorities of this state. [2] In the second 
could not have been adjudicated; be~ 
limited scope of inquiry in a habeas corpus 
connection with extradition, there was no 
so. 
Kimler contended that "when the State of 
to him into the of the 
this act upon their part operated as a 
for the crime he was sentenced for in 
California~ '' }I(r\vever, the court did not llndertake to 
decide that Preliminarily, it pointed out '' . . . 
that this is not a new requisition on a new but a 




on this old matter. . " It then found that 
and are not to 
extradition of the to the 
'' The declared that 
the detention of said um;n1om'r 
. that the Writ of Habeas Cor-
u>a.ucuc, and that the Til>1'11'1fYYH>.,. 
and detention 
the clear language of the Missouri 
fact determined was that the ''facts and circum-
not sufficient to and ' 
trial in another 
are not allowed to 
powers are limited to a determination 
of the paprrs and the of the 
22 Fla. 36, 45 [1 ) 
The United Statrs Supremr Court has described the nature 
of habeas corpus proceedings incident to extradition m the 
following languagr: "It is but one in the 
presence of the drfendant in the court in which be 
and in no manner determines the 
... thr assimilate very those commenced 
in any State for tlw a.ITCRt and detention an 
criminal. They go npon the that extradition but 
a mere 111 tlw prrsence of the defendant in the 
court in which be may. lawfully be tried." 
197 U.S. 333 S.Ct. 49 I_J.Ed. 
The contention made Kimler before the Missouri court 
that he was not a because he had been 
similar to the onr consiclerrd in Drew v. 
440 S.Ct. 59 L.Ed. 
' Holmes said: "But this is not Thaw's trial. 
clition ... , the purpose of the writ 
snbstitutP the judgnwnt of another tribunal upon the facts 
or the law of the mattrr to be tried. . . . And if it be 
true that the stated offers a nice it is a 
as to the law of New York which the New York 
courts must decide." 
So in the present case, the merits of Kimler defense 
were not for the Missouri court to determine. 'fhe ques-
572 C.2c1 
lion ac; to wlwtlwr 1\imlPr YiolatPd his parol!' by going 
to Missouri after lw was rPkasNl from prison in Illinois is 
one fot· drtPrmination by the courts of California. "If the 
eourt on hnhcas corpus inquires into the merits of the charge 
against the prisoner or into the motives which inspired the 
prosecution in the demanding State, it exceeds its authority 
under the constitutional and statutory provisions regulating 
thP extradition of criminals. The mandate of the consti-
tution requires 'a person charged in any State with a crime' 
to be delivered by the asylum State to the State whose laws 
he has violated. That State alone can determine the guilt 
or itmoeE'nce of the offending party. The theory and the 
intention of the constitutional and statutory provisions are 
that the offender shall be compelled to submit himself for 
trial to the courts of the State in which the offense was 
committed, and hence it would be usurpation of authority 
for the courts of another State to undertake to determine 
the question of his guilt in a habeas corpus proceeding.'' 
(Commonwealth v. Superintendent County Prison, 220 Pa. 401 
j6H A. 916, 21 hR.A.N.S. 939]. as quoted in In re Ray, 21fi 
Mich. 156, 165 [188 N.W. 774].) 
[4] 1\/Ioreovt>r, this court should not plaec: upon the ,judg-
mt•nt a construction which is out of harmony with the deci-
sions of the highest court of the state in which it was 
rendered. fn State v. II offmeisfer, 386 Mo. 682 [ 80 S.W.2d 
195], the Supreme Court of Missouri had before it an appli-
eation for a writ of certiorari to quash a judgment in a 
habeas corpus proceeding which discharged a paroled eon-
viet from the agent's custody. Rosenberg, an inmate of an 
111inoi,; penit(•ntiary, had been given permission to reside 
temporarily and eonditionally in Missouri. Upon information 
that ht< was under arrest upon a charge of having violated 
the law of Missouri, the warden of the Illinois institution 
orderPd him returned to custody in the penitentiary pending 
a clecision by the department of public welfare of Illinois 
npon the question of whether he had violated his parole. 
\Vhen arrested in Missouri upon an extradition warrant, 
Rosenberg attempted to secure his release in a habeas corpus 
proceeding. ''At the trial it was admitted that the requisition 
conformed to the Federal statutes and presented a prima 
facie case. However, it was contended that Rosenberg had 
not violated his parole, and for that reason was not a fugi-
tive from justice. The circuit court so found and discharged 
him. This was the only question presented. Illinois con-
,July IN RE KIMLI<..'R 573 
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t!~nds that the courts of an asylum state are without juris-
diction on habeas corpus to determine the question of the 
guilt or innocence of the person in the custody of the agent 
of the drmanding state. The contention must be sustained. 
It has beer1 so ruled by all the authorities. [18 U.S.C.A., 
~ 662, notr 61. pp. 82!1, :)30, :~:31 ] It follows that the pro-
('f'{'C1illgs and record of the Circuit Court of the Cit~· of St. 
!Jouis in th'• lwbeas cm·pus case should be quashed." (State v. 
/loffmeisfer, supra, at p. 684; quoted with approval in R:x 
pm·tc Poste1·, 60 Okla. Cr. i'iO [61 P.2d :37.:39, 40].) 
[5] Jn the Hoffmeister case, as here, the petitioner eon-
t<>nded that hr was not a parole violator. Rosenberg admittrd 
his Htatus as a parolee but argued that he had done nothing 
eontrary to the terms of his parole. Kimler says he is not 
a parole violator, although substantially charged as such, 
becanse his parole became a pardon when the California 
authoritirs permittNl him to be taken into custody by Illi-
noi~. The Snpreme Court of Missouri held that Rosenberg's 
l:ights were governed by the rnle that the asylum state may 
not inq11ire into the guilt or innocence of the accused; the 
qnestion presented >vas for the determination of the ck-
manding state. 'l'his is equally true as to Kimler, and his 
(1ischarge in habeas corpus in Missouri is not res judicata 
in the prrsent proceeding. 
Kimler also eontends that Califomia rdinquishe<1 all ju-
risdiction to pnforee completion of hiH unexpired t<>rm of 
imprisonment by relrasing him to the State of Illinois. He 
states that he did not vohmtarily accept the parole to further 
imprisonmt>nt in Illinois, and argues that statements appear-
ing in his "Ticket of Leave," which are contrary to his 
present position, were "rvidently added after petitioner's 
signature was placed thereon.'' 
Pnr~nant to an order of this conrt, a referee was appointrd 
to hrar alHl take trstimony dirrcted and rrsponsiw to the 
follo,ving questions: 
(1) Did Kimler sign ll '"l'irkrt of LeaY('" whieh thnn 
stated: ''You arr being paroled into the custody of the flli-
nois State Authorities to be by them confined. Tn the rwnt 
you are released from their custody prior to the expiration 
of your term of California imprisonment, you will contact 
the California State Parole Officer and abide by the instruc-
tions he will give you.'' 
(2) Did Kimler sign thr "Ticket of Leave" in the pres-
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and did 0. 
Kim~ 
C. More-
as witness thereto at that time 
Board of Prison Terms and Paroles order 
Kimler from the California State Prison at 
on to the custody of officers of the State of 
Illinois for the purpose of him to further 
onmcnt in state 
, upon these the referee 
each question in the affirmative. 
them made by Kimler concerns the 
determination that he was released in this state for the 
purpose of further in Illinois. 
Kimler's may be summarized 
from his counsel's brief : ''The 
before Heferee sho>YS that Kimler was granted a parole 
and that Jw \Yas extradited. Evidently the extradition would 
not have been made efl'Pctive unless a 'pa-
role.' And. the ' ' was not one that was 
or wanted 
no desire to 
as his shows. Kimler had 
return to Joliet and complete there a term of 
that he contended and still contends he wa,; 
to complete. Ther·e is no bttl 
what Kimler was extmclitecl. The evidence and 
dueed before this Court's Referee shows that 
Parole false inasmueh as Kimler was 
tied up 
and delivered over to Illinois agents who were 
with papers, but with extradition papers, towit a war-
rant the Governor surrendered Kimler 
to Illinois.'' 
one Marzec 
released upon the 
''never in fact became effective.'' 
Marzec also claimed that he "never was released on 
Folsom Prison the 
Ill CVJUHO\CCJlVU 
wrote a letter to 
State Board of Prison Directors 
the Board of Prison 'ferms and 
interview "relative to a detainer 
him. ..c'\t the interview, Kimler that 
an 
be made for his release from the Polsom 
to the Illinois prison. On November 
Illinois took delivery of Kimler who 
Leave'' and his letter of that date 
the '' 'l'icket of 
forth the conditions 
of his 
[7] Considering these facts, it is clear that Kimler went 
to the Illinois prison voluntarily under a conditional 
and this state's jurisdiction over him continued. 
su.pra.) He might have the offer of 
but once elected to accept 
express terms of the conditional release. re 
Cal.2d 674 [128 P.2d338].) 
The exceptions to the findings of the referee are 
and his determinations are adopted as the 
court. 
The oruer to show cause is ""'""a'" 




In this case the situation 1936 
was eonvicted in this state on several counts of 
extortion and kidnapping for the purpose 
sentenced to three life terms to run served 
in a prison in this state until November, 1943. Vlhen he was 
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eonvicted he was under parole commeneing December, 
]!)28. from lllinoic;. havi11g lH•en eonvicted of forgery in that 
statP. 'l'hc Illinois authorities hatl revoked his Illinois parole 
and filed a dl'tain<•r reqnec;t with the California prison author-
ities, inasmueh as his Illinois term had not been completely 
served. In March. 1943. the California authorities decided 
to parole petitioner, and in November did so, to the eustody 
of Illinois. where he would continue to serve the Illinois 
term. The condition of the parole was that upon release by 
Illinois, petitioner would contact the California parole officer 
and abide by his instructions. The state does not deny that 
no detainer of petitioner was filed with the Illinois prison 
authorities. Petitioner ·was released by Illinois in 1947, and 
upon his refusal to submit himself to California parole offi-
eers, his parole was revoked. He went to Missouri where, 
after being taken into custody pursuant to extradition pro-
ceedings instituted by California, he was ordered released 
from custody by a Missouri court in habeas corpus proceed-
ings. ('I' hose proceedings are later discussed herein.) He 
went to Oregon, then to Washington, from which state he 
was finally extradited to California, where he is now held 
to complete his term since he violated his parole. 
'rhe majority opinion asserts that the judgment in habeas 
eOl'pus proceedings releasing Kimler in Missouri is not res 
judicata because the same issues are not involved and the 
Missouri court did not have jurisdiction to deeide the issues. 
Neither of those propositions is correct. 
In connection with the Missouri habeas corpus proceed-
ings, it is clear that the same issues were involved as are now 
presented, that is, the waiver by California of further juris-
diction over petitioner rather than, as claimed by the state, 
the sufficieney of the warrant in the Missouri extradition 
proceedings. 
In the Missouri ease, petitioner alleged in his application 
that he was being held on a warrant for violation of his 
California parole; that the Governor had issued a warrant 
for his arrest pursuant to extradition proceedings on the 
basis that petitioner was a fugitive from justice; that he was 
not a fugitive from justice for he was convicted and impris-
oned in California, then he was granted what was ''termed'' 
a parole into the custody of the Illinois authorities and taken 
by them to Illinois; that no ''hold order'' was placed by 
California with the Illinois authorities; that when California 
''attempted to parole him into the custody of the Illinois 
there and serve in the 
life \YOUld 
him for his offense.'' No contention ·was 
made that the request or warrant in the extradition pro-
was insufficient. 
The return to the application for the writ rested on the 
extradition papers and that Kimler was a from 
The stipulated facts joined in by the extradition 
for California set forth the events heretofore 
including the parole papers. They show that Kimler was 
convicted and imprisoned in California; that he the 
parole ticket of leave to Illinois; that thereafter he ''was 
taken by officers and agents of ... Illinois who handcuffed 
him and took him from the California State Prison at Fol-
som, ·with the consent and of tl1e authori-
ties of California and returned him to ... Illinois where he 
vvas again incarcerated in the Illinois State at 
,Joliet until about the 9th day of July, 1947, when he had 
eompleted his sentence and was then diseharged the State 
of Illinois'' ; that he refused to submit to the parole officers 
in Missouri or accept a California parole. 
At the hearing it was shown that Kimler had 
convicted of the crime in California, rather than 
charged with it; that a detainer notice had been filed by 
Illinois with the California prison authorities and no 
could be granted "'When such was the The 
tioned the California agent in 
only charg·ed or had alrrady been 
has alrrad; .. been tried and thrre on 
Warrant 
it would appear there was a new him. 
T suppose there is not any question but that this is not a new 
requisition on a new complaint, but a requisition on this old 
matter? MR. BRENN AN (California agent) : That is right. 
37 C.2d-19 
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::\lR. ll OTJGH: That is agreed, your Honor. There is nothing 
prnding· against him in the Rtate of California, except that 
which has already b('<'ll adjudieated. THE CouRT: The Court 
orders the discharge of thP petitioner from custody." The 
plain inference is that the judge wanted to make clear that 
there was not a charge against Kimler other than the one 
of which he was convicted, thus indicating that he felt 
Kimler's claim that California had waived any further claim 
ovee him under the conviction was well taken, and, as there 
was no new charge, the prisoner should be discharged for 
he was not a fugitive from justice. This is further evinced by 
the judge's judgment of discharge where he stated: "The 
Court finds that the facts and circumstances are not suffi-
cient to justify the surrender and extradition of the petitioner 
to the State of California and no sufficient cause for the 
detention of the said petitioner appearing, it is ordered by 
the Court that the Writ of Habeas Corpus be sustained and 
made permanent, and that the petitioner, Charles Walker 
Kimler, be, by Arthur Mosely, Sheriff of St. Louis County 
and Joseph B. Brennan, Agent of the State of California, 
discharged from imprisonment and detention for the cause 
aforesaid.'' (Italics added.) The ''facts and circumstances'' 
referred to in the judgment indicate the delivery of Kimler 
to Illinois without any detainer other than some defect in 
the extradition warrant, and the judgment is presumed to 
be responsive to the claim made in the application. We 
may presume that the judgment was based upon the claims 
made in the pleadings rather than an unmentioned ground. 
(See Woolverton v. Baker, 98 CaL 628 [33 P. 731].) More-
over, in considering the queries by the judge concerning 
whether the extradition was based on an old or new charge, 
it has long been the practice to treat a parole violator as 
a prrson charged with a crime in extradition proceedings. 
(See In 1·e McBride, 101 Cal.App. 251 [281 P. 651]; case:-; 
cited 78 A.I_l.R. 424; 22 Am.Jur., Extradition, § 25.) 
'J'hus, I have presented and decided in favor of Kimler 
in the Missouri proceedings the question of whether the de-
li very of Kimler to the Illinois authorities by California 
under the circumstances established that California had re-
linquished any further claim over Kimler even though he 
signed the ticket of leave. (See similar question considered : 
In re Marzec, 25 Cal.2d 794 [154 P.2d 873] ; In re Whitting-
ton, 34 Cal.App. 344 [167 P. 4041 ; and People v. Bartley, 
383 Ill. 437 [50 N.E.2d 517].) 
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The agent designated by California to receive Kimler in 
the Missouri extradition proceedings was active and partici-
pated in the habeas corpus matter. Although he did not 
have aetual custody of Kimler (he was being held by a 
Missouri sheriff), he was named a respondent therein. He 
joined in the stipulation of facts and testified at the hear-
ing. Under these circumstances, California was adequately 
rf'presentecl in the habeas corpus cause. 
'I'hr discharge of Kimler in Missouri must be treated as 
res judicata on the issue above mentioned, that is, that there 
is no longer any basis for California to imprison Kimler 
arising from his conviction here, and therefore he is entitled 
to a discharge in this proceeding. The general policy of 
treating a discharge in habeas corpus as final has been estab-
lished. ''No person who has been discharged by the order 
of the court or judge upon habeas corpus can be again im-
prisoned, restrained, or kept in custody for the same cause, 
Pxeept in tl1c following cases: 1. If he has been discharged 
from custody on a criminal charge, and is afterwards com-
mitted for the same offense, by legal order or process ; 2. If, 
after a discharge for defect of proof, or for any defect of 
the process, warrant, or commitment in a criminal case, the 
prisoner is again arrested on sufficient proof and committed 
by legal process for the same offense." (Pen. Code, § 1496.) 
In the instant case it is clear that the Missouri proceeding 
dors not fall within either of the two exceptions. It was 
not a case where the accused was discharged from custody 
for some defect in tl1c process or trial proceedings. Further 
it is statPd: "Every person who either solely or as a member 
of a court knowingly and unlawfully recommits, imprisons, 
or restrains of his librrty, for the same cause, any person 
who has been discharged upon a writ of habeas corpus, is 
g-uilty of a misdemeanor." (Pen. Codr, § 363.) This court 
has said on the subject: ''A judgment of discharg-e upon 
habeas (:orpus may or may not be res adjudicata, but this 
will drprnd wholly upon the questions necessarily clPterminNl 
in the deeision upon the writ. The rights of prisoners under 
the writ of habeas corpus were first crystallized in the Eng-
lish Habeas Corpus Act of 31 Car. II. By seetion 6 of that 
act, for the prevention of unjust vexation by reiterated com-
mitments for the same offem;e, it was enacted 'that no person 
or persons which shall be delivered or set at large upon any 
habeas corpus, shall at any time hereafter be again impris-
oned or committed for the same offense by any person or 
C.2d 
coolie was 
upon habeas corpus, upon the 
had been committed a second time for the same of-
to the sixth section of 31 Car. IT, the 
Lord Justice Mellish, said 
vdth the construction which the chief 
section of the statute: 'The principal 
""'"uvH seems to have been to persons who 
up on a writ of habeas corpus and discharged 
bail and into their O>Yn recognizance from 
arrested for the same offense and obliged to sue 
out a second writ. This appears from the provision by which 
the person may be again arrested by the order 
of the wherein he shall be bound by recognizance to 
appear. Though I think, however, it [section 6] can only 
the seeond arrest is substantially the same cause 
as the so that the return to the second writ of habeas 
corpus rahwd for the opinion of the court the same question 
with reference to the validity of the grounds of detention as 
the first.' '!'his is but another way of stating the proposition 
that the upon habeas corpus operates as a bar 
as to the particular proceeding or process 
and it is res adjudicata only upon the same 
under the same state of facts. Thus it 
has been he1d that a upon habeas corpus for failure 
of does not bar further prosecution upon another indict-
ment. In ril 59 Kan. 671, it is accordingly held 
that \dwrc a court discharges a petitioner because no offense 
was for which he could be prosecuted, its order not 
restores him to JibPrty, but terminates pending pro-
and he cannot be arrested or 
is instituted ~"'.u"'"' 
a7 Minn. 404, it was held that a 
corpus for defect of proof merely 
proceeding so that the cannot 
from arrest 
and determination of some material 
, it cannot be held that 
an estoppel against the now 
the arn•st and removal for trial of the relator . . re 
186 Cal. 29a, 2f!7 P. .) 
A similar view has been 
eluding Missouri. E:r. 
r128 S.\Y.2d J082]; Um:ted F. 
951 C.C.A. 639] ; In 1·e 59 Kan. 671 P. 
686]; 25 Am.Jnr., Habeas Corpus, § 157 
Judgments, § 827, p. 1759 et. seq.) For 
parte iii· essina, supra, the Missouri court was concerned with 
a prisoner who was held pursuant to extradition proceed-
ings by the Missouri police on warrant of the governor of 
that state at the request of the governor of Kansas. The 
Kansas agent appeared. 'l'he habeas corpus 
and pleaded a release on a writ obtained years 
on similar extradition proceedings where it was found that 
the prisoner >vas not a from for he had not 
been in Kansas at the time of the crime. His >vas upheld, 
no new facts appearing. 
The Inajority opinion relies upon State 
336 1\:Io. 682 [80 S.W.2d 195], but as seen Ex 
supra, is a later and controlling decision. I think 
it is therefore, that the Missouri court did have 
diction and did decide the Its 
should be respected. No reason for 
I conclude, therefore, that a 
nuder the circumstances here 
corpus 
made either in 
California or Missouri, would be res in another pro-
ceeding in the same state. 
It is the general policy o£ this state to conclusive 
effect to the judgments of sister states. "The effect of a 
judicial record of a sister state is the same in tMs state as in 
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the state where it u•as made, cxeept that it can only he en~ 
fon~ed here by an CJction or sp0eial proceeding . " (Code 
Civ Proe., § 1913.) (S0e Biewend v. Biewend, 17 CaU~d 
108 [109 P.2d 701, 132 A.L.R. 1264] ; Gilmer v. Spitalny, 84 
Cal.App.2d 39 [189 P.2d 744].) And the writ of habeas 
c:orpus is the writ of freedom and where there has been a 
<lischargt• thereunder, the pri:-:;oner should not be further 
hara;;sed under the same set of circumstances. The State of 
California actively participated in the Missouri court pro-
eeedings and I assume that court applied California law in 
arriving at its eonclusion. There is, therefore, no reason why 
the Missouri judg1nent should not be given binding effeet. 
There are cases whieh have said that a discharge through 
habeas corpus in another state will not be given effect in the 
state where thr aeeused is charged with a crime. (See Ex 
parte Silverman, 69 Ohio App. 128 [ 42 N.E.2d 87] ; State v. 
Wall, 187 Minn. 246 [244 N.W. 811, 85 A.L.R. 114]; Let-
wick v. State, 211 Ark. 1 [198 S.W.2d 830] .) In the 
Silverman and Letwick cases, the question of waiver of fur-
ther right to punish the prisoner was not involved. The 
issue in the asylum state habeas corpus proceedings was 
whether under the conditions then existing the prisoner was 
lawfully in custody. They did not concern a situation such 
as we have here where the conditions and issues are identical. 
Nor vvere the same issues presented in the \Vall case, where 
the court relied on the premise that the discharge would not 
be res judicata in the asylum state. As we have seen, it 
would be res judicata in Missouri, the asylum state here, as 
well as in California, the demanding state. 
Similar comments are applicable to the general rule that 
a discharge on habeas corpus from custody grounded on 
extradition proceedings does not bar subsequent arrest, for 
in those cases the release is bottomed on some defect in the 
extradition proceedings such as the warrant or otherwise, 
and naturally when those defects are corrected, the second 
habeas corpus proceedings involve new issues and different 
facts. Whatever may be the usual rule, I see no valid reason 
for not giving conclusive effect to the Missouri judgment 
here where the issues are identical, the proper law was ap-
plied, and this state was adequately represented. 
It has been held in the federal courts that habeas corpus 
was not available to release a prisoner held on an extradition 
warrant where the grounds claimed were that he would be 
given unconstitutional treatment if the prisoner were re-
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turned to the demanding state. (United States v. McClain, 
42 F.Supp. 429; Johnson v. Matthews, 182 F.2d 677.) But 
the contrary has also been held. (Johnson v. Dye, 175 F.2d 
250, reversed for failure to exhaust remedies in state court, 
Dye v. Johnson, 338 U.S. 864 [70 S.Ct. 146, 94 L.Ed. 530]; 
Ree Harper v. Wall, 85 F.Supp. 78:3; Application of Middle-
brooks, 88 F.Snpp. 943: Ex parte Marshall, 85 F.Supp. 771.) 
The court in ,Johnson v. Matthews, supra, seemed to think it 
did not havr jurisdiction but here the Missouri court took 
jurisdiction and decided the identical issue now presented, 
and there is no reason why we should ignore its adjudication 
in view of the strong policy of this state to give "full faith 
and credit'' to judgments of sister states. The Matthews casP 
does not hold, as has been suggested, that a court in an 
asylum state could not constitutionally have jurisdiction to 
decide the issue of whether the demanding state has waived 
all elaim to thi' exaction of further penal punishmfmt. While 
it ma;v not be customary to settle such an issue in habeas 
\'Orpns proceedings in the asylum state following the initi-
ation of extradition proceedings, yet that question was pre-
sented here with this state participating and was decided. 
The policy arguments with respect to extradition might well 
have been advanced by California in the Missouri proceed-
ings, but were not. Now we have the solemn adjudication of 
Missouri-a sisti'r state-and the settled policy is to recognize 
that adjudication. In the inti'rests of interstate harmony, 
it should not be disregarded. 
I would therefore releasi' petitioni'r from custody forth-
with. 
